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PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE:
MEDICAL, ETHICAL, RELIGIOUS,
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES
John B. Oldershaw,MD., JD.*
JeffAtkinson, JD.**
Louis D. Boshes, M.D.,FA.C.P. "'

INTRODUCTION
Increasing attention has focused on the ethical, social, economical, and
legal aspects of certain neurological conditions. These neurologic
conditions include some that are refractory to known present day
treatment. Due to the advancement of technology, it is possible to
maintain patients for long periods of time on support systems, despite the
fact those patients have no real hope of any cure or improved quality of
life. However, the cost of such maintenance is very high in utilization of
valuable resources. Nevertheless, arbitrary cessation of treatment is not
morally or legally defensible.
Human beings are distinguished from other living beings by their
souls, spirits, and personalities. These solely human aspects matter most
to families and friends, and are the precise reason the decision makingprocess in conditions such as persistent vegetative state (PVS) is so
difficult. When dealing with patients with PVS, physicians should
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advocate for the patient and protect the patient from further pain caused
by unnecessary treatment. However, the physician should also be
concerned with justice, and the appropriate allocation of resources and, in
addition, with the possible legal ramifications.
From a historical perspective, the role of a physician has evolved from
relatively passive to an active one. Scientific discoveries have enabled the
physicians to have more control over physiologic and pathologic processes.
From a societal viewpoint, the physician's stature has risen to a more
paternalistic position where patients and their families often accept
physician recommendations without question.
PVS as a Paradigm
The problem of PVS is particularly vexing and lends itself as a model for
other neurologic conditions. The term "vegetative state" was proposed by
Jennett and Plum in 1972 to describe a chronic condition that encompasses
diurnal wakefulness accompanied by a lack of cognitive function.4 Eyes
open spontaneously in response to verbal stimuli; but there are no
localizing motor responses, and no response to verbal commands. 5
Long-term survival in the vegetative condition occurs in a very small
percentage of cases. Early diagnosis is difficult to make and is only evident
as the convalescent days blend into weeks. After approximately one month
the condition is, in most cases, fixed. However, there is one reasonably
well docurmnted report of a recovery after two years.6 The patient was a
forty-three year old man who remained vegetative for eighteen months
after an anoxic, ischemic (lack of oxygenation) injury.7 The patient neither
opened his eyes nor had motor responses to noxious stimuli for six
months." He then awakened but remained vegetative for another year after
which time he began to speak and follow commands. 9 After two years, he

4

See generally B. Jennett & G. Plum, PersistentVegetative State After BrainDamage:

A Syndrome in Search of a Name, 1LANcET 734-747 (1972).
sa.

'G.A. Rosenberg, S. F. Jonson, & R. P. Brenner, Recovery of Cognition After Prolonged
Vegetative
State, 2 ANN. NEuROL. 167-8 (1977).
7
Id.

8
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scored 100 on the verbal section of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(WAIS); but, even then, the patient was paralyzed in three extremities and
10
totally dependent.
In developing practical guidelines for withdrawal or termination of
therapy, an algorithm can be helpful. Accurate diagnosis and prognosis is
mandatory, and care must be taken to avoid bias. Thus, the algorithm must
be applicable to all groups, regardless of economic or ethnic status.
Religious, cultural, and ethical considerations are also critical in the
decision-making process. If a person with PVS, in spite of being alive and
recognizable to colleagues and relatives, is no longer present in the full
human sense, then futility concepts must also be weighed. Economic costs
and limited resources must be considered while avoiding legal vulnerability.
This article examines these issues and suggests an approach toward
resolution of the problem.
MEDICAL PERSPECTIVE
Defining PVS
PVS has been referred to by many other names including akinetic mutism,
apallic syndrome and "locked in syndrome." However, none of these
names squarely fit the clinical description. Obviously, not all patients are
mute. Further, apallic syndrome refers to patients with apraxia and agnosia
which involve right and left hemisphere cortical deficits, not necessarily
hallmark conditions of PVS. "Locked in syndrome" is likewise
inapplicable, because it refers to a deafferented or disconnected state with
primary pathology situated in the ventral pons. However, PVS patients
remain conscious but cannot communicate. Jennet and Plum borrowed
from the Oxford English Dictionary the word "vegetate," which means "to
live a physical life, devoid of intellectual activity or social intercourse;" 1
hence, the term persistent vegetative state.
Both the American Academy of Neurology and the American Medical
Association define patients in a persistent vegetative state as being
chronically awake, or suffering diurnal sleep-wake cycles, but without

10

1

d.

Jennett & Plum, supra note 1.
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consciousness of their surroundings.12 The primary pathology involves
diffuse cortical dysfunction which may result from an acute incident such
as trauma, ischemia, or hypoxia. Initially, and usually, this dysfunction
renders the victim comatose prior to evolving into a true persistent
vegetative state. PVS may also be caused by more chronic progressive
illnesses such as Alzheimer's disease or demyelinating diseases. In PVS,
the brain stem remains intact and accounts for the residual "vegetative"
symptoms. PVS patients are able to open and move their eyes, have
normal sleep/wake cycles, spontaneously smile, chew and swallow. Also,
many PVS patients can maintain independent respiratory function;
however, vocalization is often limited to grunting noises. Motor
movement is restricted to posturing and reflexive withdrawal responses to
noxious stimulation. Because the cerebral cortex is not functioning, PVS
patients essentially have "amentia," a lack of language function. It is
believed patients in a persistent vegetative state do not experience pain and
suffering, because both emotions are conscious attributes requiring an
intact cerebrum.
The diagnosis of PVS relies heavily on clinical assessment. Magnetic
resonance (MR) and computerized axial tomography (Cl) scans of the
head show variable abnormalities, and electroencephalogram (EEG) is also
unreliable. Depending on the etiology of the PVS, most patients are in a
vegetative state for one month or more and do not recover to a level of
independent function. The American Academy of Neurology recommends
a waiting period of three months to establish the PVS diagnosis.13 The
American Medical Association recommends a twelve month waiting period
to confirm the diagnosis and prognosis. 4

12
Position of the American Academy of Neurology on CertainAspects of the Care and
Management of the PersistentVegetative State Patient: Adopted by the Executive Board,
AmericanAcademy ofNeurology,April21,1988, Cincinnati,Ohio, 39 NEuROLO3Y 125-6 (1989)
[hereinafter "American Academy of Neurology"]; Council on Scientific Affairs & Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or
WithholdLife Support, 263 JAMA 426-430 (1990) [hereinafter "AMA Councils"].
3
American Academy of Neurology, supranote 12.
14,AA Councils, supranote 12.
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Distinguishing Brain Death
From PVS
PVS is not brain death or coma. Brain death refers to complete failure of
the functioning of the cerebral cortex and brain stern; and persistent coma
involves extensive damage to the reticular-activating system, resulting in
an inability to arouse the patient. With supportive care, many PVS patients
survive for months, and even years.
The presently accepted standard definition of whole or global brain
death, under the Uniform Determination of Death Act, specifies that an
individual can be determined to be dead if the person has sustained
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain including the brain
stem., Redefining brain death to include patients in PVS and anencephalic
infants poses clinical, legal, and moral dilemmas. A concept of cortical
brain death involving the loss of higher brain function which then equates
to the loss ofpersonhood is not currently accepted as being equal to death.
In anencephalias, the infant is missing the higher brain centers and is
termed by some as "brain absent." PVS patients, however, have lost what
they once had, namely the part of the brain that mediates behavior
constituting personhood, or functioning of that human behavior.
Frequently, both anencephalias and PVS patients can breathe
independently;, and, therefore, neither qualify as having whole brain death
or brainstem death. In anencephaly there is no possible future independent
function; yet, despite periods of apnea, the brain stem is still intact. The
patient usually continues to be totally dependent until such time that
overwhelming infection intervenes.
A federal appeals court ruling determined a Virginia hospital must
provide life support measures for an anencephalic infant.16 Fairfax Hospital
in Fals Church, Virginia was ordered to maintain an anencephalic infant in
a decision based on the 1986 Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA), referred to as the Anti-Dumping Act.1 7 This bill
was designed to prohibit private hospitals from refusing uninsured patients
'See PRESmENT'S CoMaMSSION FOR THE STUDY OF EnucAL PROBLEMS INMCINEAND
BOMEDrLBAVioRALREAR CH, DEFiNnG DEATH: lmBICAL, LEGAL AND EmIc'OA IssuEs
INTHE DETERMINATION OF DEATH (U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1981).
'I1n re Baby K., 16 F.3d 590, 592 (4th Cir. 1994).
'71d. at 598; 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1992).
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needed emergency care.'" The application of the anti-dumping law to the
anencephalic infant was based on a finding that the infant suffered from the
condition of apnea which requires emergency respiratory assi,;tance.' 9 The
court avoided the issue of cortical brain death or absent cortex which
would render further treatment futile.
A number of ethicists have suggested amending the Uniform
Determination of Death Act to include a provision declaring anencephalic
infants dead at birth in order to make their organs available for purposes
of transplantation.20

In contrast, there remains a vocal minority in

philosophy, theology, and medicine who object to the concept of brain
death, to say nothing of lack of personhood or other features of persistent
vegetative state. That minority views the practice of organ transplantation
as utilitarian, with a strong financial motivation for increasing the donor
pool. This leads to the questioning of the intellectual fotmdations for
defining "brain death". 1
Rules and regulations regarding human tissue for transplantation have
been proposed by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
and Food and Drug Administration (FDA).' Although the intent of this
rule is to prevent the transmission of acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS) and hepatitis through human tissue used in transplantation, the
required donor testing and screening should also serve as a safeguard
against premature decisions in the organ donation process.
Accuracy of Diagnosis and Standard
of Proof Required for PVS
The neurologic community generally concurs that PVS and coma are
clinical diagnoses. The Plum and Posner definition of coma is a state of
unarousable psychological unresponsiveness in which patients lie with their

18

1n re Baby K., 16 F.3d at 593.
19d. at 596.
IG. L Annas & S. Shimar, AnencephalicNewborns as OrganDonors, 259 JAMA 2284

(1988).
IR. Nilges, Ethics of Brain Death, Thoughts of a NeurosurgeonConsideringRetirement,

47(2) PHAROs 34-35 (1984).
22See 21 C.F.R. § 16, 1270 (proposed Dec. 14, 1993).
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eyes closed 3 Jennett and Plum defined PVS as a state in which patients
lack evidence of any adaptive response to the external environrnnt, i.e.,
the absence of any evidence of a functioning mind which is either receiving
or projecting information in a patient who has long periods of
wakefulness.' Therefore, the difference between coma and PVS is that
coma is a closed-eye state of unresponsiveness, whereas PVS is an openeyed condition with no evidence of conscious awareness.
A recent study found approximately 37 percent of patients after more
than one month post injury were diagnosed with coma or PVS
inaccurately? The errors in diagnosis were believed to be the result of
confusion in terminology, lack of extended observation of patients, and
lack of skill or training in the assessmnt of neurologically devastated
patients.26
In another study, the diagnosis of PVS in children was only 16
percent accurate in infants younger than two months, but 70 percent
accurate in children who range in age from two months to two years.'
Also, the diagnosis of PVS could be made in children with severe
congenital brain malformations in 80 percent of cases.' Life expectancy
from the tim of injury for the various age groups with PVS was: 4.1 years
for newborn to two months; 5.5 years for two months to two years; 7.3
years for two to seven years; and 7.4 years for those greater than seven
years in age. 9
Another recent study examining recovery from PVS involved a
retrospective review of forty-three consecutive patients admitted to a unit
specializing in the rehabilitation of people in the persistent vegetative

MIEDICAL RSEARCH CouNci., BRA IN ims Co.,mmm A GLOss.-aY OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL Thmis CoMMoY UsED N CASES OF HF-D kmmJY, IMEDICAL RESE.ptCiH
CoUNCiL WAR MORANDUM #4 HMSO (London, 1941).
24
Jennett & Plum, supra note 1.
25N.L Childs, et al., Accuracy ofDiagnosisofPersistentVegetative State,43 NEUROLGY
1465-67 (1993).
26Id.

'See generally, E.C. Meyer, et al., The PersistentVegetativeState in Children.Report of
the ChildNeurology Society Ethics Committee, 32 ANN. NEUROI 570-76 (1992).
21d.
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state.3 ° It revealed 25 percent of these patients regained awareness four
months or more after suffering brain damage.31 Eye tracking was reported
beginning between four months and three years, and response to command
was reported beginning between four and twelve months.32 Wile only one
patient regained the ability to commnicate, six were able to use nonverbal
methods of indicating at least a "yes" or "no" response; and four were able
to minimally speak.33 Six patients remained totally dependent while two
became independent in daily activities.' Four patients became independent
in feeding, three required help, and four remained on gastrostomy
feeding.35 Thus, some patients can regain awareness after more than four
months in a vegetative state and, although few reach full independence,
most patients can achieve an improved quality of life within the limitations
of their disabilities.36 Nonetheless, the recovery period is prolonged and
may continue for several years.37
Improvement in the accuracy of the diagnosis of PVS may be
expected with some newer techniques. One of these is the cranial positron
emission tomography (PET) scan.3' This imaging technique detects
production of cerebral glucose metabolism and may b- used as a
confirmatory test to the clinical diagnosis.3 9 It has been used in both
children and adults with a high degree of accuracy.4" Other studies include
planar brain scintigraphy oxygen seventeen uptake, and functional

K. Andrews, Recovery ofPatientsAfter 4 Months or More in the PersistentVegetative
State, 306 BRIT. MEm. L 1597-1600 (1993).
31
1d.
32
1d.
3Id.
31Id.
35
1d.
Md.
37d.
38

See generally D.E. Levy, et al., Differences in CerebralBlood Flow and Glucose
Utilization in Vegetative Versus Locked-In Patients,22 ANN NEUROL 673-82 (1987).
39
1d.
40
1d.
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magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI, all measuring changes in regional
cerebral blood flow.4'
A degree of diagnosis accuracy nearly 100 percent is necessary to
make recomnendations and terminal decisions in PVS. From a legal
perspective, the diagnosis should be beyond a reasonable doubt, the highest
level standard of proof, in order to obviate any potential allegation of
culpable error. In addition, this standard should comport with the highest
degree of medical and moral certainty.
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE
Futility of Treatment v. Efficacious Treatment
For the purposes of this discussion, the aim of PVS treatment should be to
return the individual to a sapient existence. However, this does not imply
awakening to marginal consciousness without self awareness or capacity
to interact humanly with one's family and friends. To return to permanent
marginal consciousness without self awareness and intellectual capacity
would be an unacceptable outcome of medical treatment, because the very
essence of humanness would undoubtedly be lost. Unless there is
reasonable hope of returning to a sapient existence, the individual is
deemed "dying," even though the death may be prolonged by cure-oriented
interventions such as dialysis, ventilators, or artificial nutrition and
hydration. Quite simply, human beings are mortal; there is an inevitable
necessity to die, because death is a normal part of the life process.
Medical futility can be distinguished in a quantitative and a qualitative
sense. Quantitative futility refers to an expectation of success that is
predictably unlikely, and qualitative futility refers to any treatment that
merely preserves permanent unconsciousness or fails to end total
dependence on intensive medical care. Medical necessity, on the other
hand, can be defined as services which have been reasonably well
demonstrated to provide significant health benefit. Necessity is that care

41

See generally W. Oder, et aL, HM-PAO-=SPECT in PersistentVegctative State After Head
Injury: PrognosticIndicatorof the Likelilwod of Recovery?, 17 INM smVB CAREM . 149-53

(1991).
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which could be reasonably expected to return the patient to a sapient
existence in more than 50 percent of cases.
The Hastings Center guidelines define "physiological futility" as
treatment which is "clearly futile in achieving its physiological objective
and so offers no physiological benefit to the patient."42 Physiological here
refers to reasonably normal function of the biological systems and includes
sapient existence.43 Once a decision is framed by the teim "futility," it
often provides justification for physicians to either override the wishes of
the patient, family, or other surrogates, or make a nontreatment decision
without obtaining informed consent or discussing the unilateral decision
with the patient, family, or surrogate.' The latter, of course, does not
consider the wishes, culture, religion or morals of the patient's family. For
example, a judgment whether a short existence with severe disability is a
life worth living is a personal value judgment, and not merely a medical
judgment. A person could effect closure of his temporal life during this
time and, thus, financial and business matters could sufficiently be settled.
Further, family and personal closure could be affected and spiritual
preparations made. Another aspect of futility is the consideration of
limited health care resources that could be available for other patients with
45
a more reasonable expectation of success.
Medical futility is a psychologically tolerable way of speaking about
the most difficult end of life decisions within families and communities. It
provides a framework within which the value of life, the inevitability of
death, professional responsibility, and social justice can be :reconciled.
Futility of Treatment versus
Futility of Life
In PVS, a determination could be made that the PVS life is a life not worth
living. Unfortunately, this phrase has negative connotations, because it
was used more than sixty years ago by the Nazis as an attempt to

4R. Cranford & L Gostin, Futility: A Concept in Search of a Definition, 20 LAW, MED.
& HEALTH CAMP 307 (1992).
4Id.
45

Id.
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rationalize the elimination of persons whose lives were viewed as
"defective."
The concept of futility may be quite variable and have different
meanings to different people depending on whose "quality of life" is in
question. For example, a smile may be a satisfactory level of recovery for
a mother helping her son in a PVS after a motorcycle accident. However,
life in a wheelchair may not be satisfactory to an athlete who was vigorous
and physically active prior to the accident. Therefore, quality of life and
futility depends greatly on the patient's individual outlook on life and the
outlook of a patient's family.
Professional medical associations and organizations may develop
practice guidelines to define futility, but decisions about futility require the
nature and value of life to be defined. Physicians, however, cannot extend
their expertise to determining these values except at extreme limits. In one
case, it may be too early to determine whether the condition of PVS is
permanent or transient, as in the first weeks after the onset of PVS. In
another case, there may be clear, objective, clinical, and scientific evidence
of permanent PVS.
Except at these extremes, physicians cannot substitute their own
judgment for that of either the patient's family or the court. However, it
would be impractical for the court to decide every futility case. The
ponderous and costly nature of such cases would negate any economic
benefit resulting from the termination of life-sustaining treatment.
A distinction must be made between futility of treatment and futility
of life. A decision not to use medically futile therapy does not devalue life.
Also there is no legal or moral obligation to render futile treatment. The
question may be raised whether an existing or proposed treatment offers
reasonable hope of benefit to the patient. Here, one must understand the
patient's concept of benefit. To some patients, longer survival in an
atmosphere of intensive care, compared with a shorter life span at home,
may not be considered "a benefit." On the other hand, more aggressive
therapy for a terminal, but conscious patient, may be desirable to achieve
maximum time to conclude personal or business affairs.
Certain treatments may not be futile in themselves. However, in the
overall scheme, such treatments would be burdensome to the family by
maintaining a life that has little or no expectation of return to a sapient
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existence. A distinction may be drawn between offensive and defensive
futility analysis. In defensive futility analysis, a family may have reached
a judgrent based on medical, religious, social, and personal grounds that
a particular form of life support should no longer be employed. 47 Futility
is then employed as a defense against charges that the withdrawal of
treatment amounts to abuse of the patient or homicide.' This defense
could only be overcome if the treatment was shown to benefit the patient,
or if an element of criminal intent motivated the decision to withdraw
treatment. 4 9 By contrast, the concept of offensive futility analysis involves

health care providers in discussions about the withdrawal of treatment or
involves the initiation of legal action to this end." Courts with jurisdiction
over personal guardianship may be called upon to assess futility criteria in
those cases involving incompetent patients.
It is important to avoid any perception or suggestion of a double
standard implying the patient knows best so long as the patient or
surrogate wishes to forego treatment, but the doctor kmows best if
otherwise. Moreover, an overly paternalistic view of physician autonomy
may result in disregard for the patient's or family's wishes.
In determining the burdens or benefits of a particular treatment, it is
appropriate for physicians to consider that the mechanics of intensive care
themselves contribute to a poor quality of life. However, a conclusion that
the mental or physical life of the patient is of poor quality, and not worth
the effort to sustain it, is a more questionable type of futility analysis by the
physician.
Further, futility analysis cannot assess a family's experience of
closeness to a patient who, in the medical view, may appear beyond the
capacity for such an experience. The family may perceive the patient is in
some contact, because patients occasionally show response to family and
loved ones but not others. This phenomena may have a scientific basis
verifiable with metabolic imaging in the future. Also, futility analysis
'See generally E.R. Grant, MedicalFutility: Legal and EthicalAspecis, 20 LAW, MED.

&HEALTH CARE 330-35 (1992).
,ld.
4MId
49

Id.
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cannot rneastue how much time is enough for a family to grieve and accept
the inevitable.
The success of futility analysis depends upon both a recognition of its
limitations as a form of moral certainty, and also on a recognition of its
value as a nrans of moral persuasion. To this end, ethics committees have
an important and practical educational role. These committees can provide
an opportunity for a balanced discussion of patient rights to terminate care
based on individual autonomy and the patient's right to health care.
Removal of Cardiopulmonary Support,
Antibiotic Therapy and Other
Medical Treatments
In most instances, the families of patients with PVS are in agreement with
physicians in terms of withholding measures such as antibiotics,
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and dialysis. Only ardent pro-life advocates
disagree with this position. However, cardiorespiratory arrest seldom
occurs, and repeated infections are resolved in nearly 50 percent of cases
even without the use of antibiotics.
Withdrawal of Artificial Nutrition
and Hydration
One aspect of the debate over stopping treatment in PVS concerns
suffering the patient may experience with removal of a respirator, or the
discomfort associated with starvation and dehydration after removal of a
feeding tube. PVS destroys the capacity to perceive a wide range of
stimuli and the neocortical or higher brain functions needed to generate a
self-perceived, affective response such stimuli Pain cannot be experienced
by a brain that no longer retains the neurological substrate for suffering.
A growing body of literature indicates the symptoms of death by
starvation are not severe. Following cessation of fluid intake,
hypernatremia (excess salt condition) develops slowly and induces
confusion, weakness, and lethargy which eventually progresses to impaired
consciousness. The patient slowly progresses into unconsciousness over
a period of days without complaining of pain or discomfort. In otherwise
alert cancer patients, final hours of life are often marked by a sense of well-
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being following cessation of fluid therapy.5" One recurring physical
complaint related to the absence of oral fluid intake is a dry mouth.5" This
minimal discomfort can be alleviated by attending to oral hygiene such as
providing ice chips, moistening cloths, and mildly irrigating. Total
starvation is ironically associated with euphoria, in contrast to semistarvation which produces intense discomfort and depression. Rather than
of inducing pain, food deprivation typically causes hypalgesia and/or
analgesia.
An important feature of this dying process is the attentiveness of the
medical personnel, family members, and friends of the patient. A sense of
abandonment is common in the awake patient, causing psychological
suffering which often exceeds any purely physical pain or discomfort.53
RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE
Culture influences the way in which patients, families, health care

providers, and members of institutional ethics committees understand and
resolve ethical difficulties. Included in culture are the shared ideas, beliefs,
and meanings that human groups consider important in their lives. Culture
develops around affinities such as national heritage, occupation, political
persuasion, religion, or neighborhood. Further, the attributes of social
class, age, and sex also contribute to varying cultural frarreworks.
Culture affects our notions of what practices are clirdcally right or
wrong and, therefore, gives meaning to the experience of illness and
suffering defining what life and death are. Culture delineates the nature of
ourselves, our desires, our relations with others, and what we consider to
be appropriate and ethical in the context of health care. Culture leads us
to choose a physician instead of a shaman for the relief of pain. It is
culture that allows some of us to expect a terminal diagnosis to be withheld
from a patient, a fetus to be granted the status and privileges of a person,
or no technological effort to be spared in the prolongation of a patient's
51

G.F. Cahill, Hyperglycemic HyperosmolarComa: A Syndrome Almost Unique to the
Elderly, 31 J. AM. GERIATRIC. Soc'Y 103-5 (1983).
5M.J. Baines, Control of Other Symptoms, in TM MANAmMENT OF TIRM1NAL ILLNESS
(C.M. Saunders ed., 1978).

5T'maothy Quill, Doctor,I Want to Die. Will You Help Me?, 270 JAMA 870-73 (1993).
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life. One's agreernnt or disagreenent with those expectations is most
likely a product of one's own culture.
One example of this cultural influence is the Christian concept of the
meaning of dying as put forth by several Jesuit theologians.5 In this
theological view, the spirituality of a Christian dying is the manifestation
of fundamental faith.' In the Eucharist, the principal focal point of
Christian faith, members of the faith relive, over and over again, their union
with Christ's life, death, and resurrection.' It is believed that as the person
receives and responds to living a life in Christ's likeness, the person is
eventually drawn to receive and enter into the grace of sharing and dying
of Christy In this fashion, Catholic moral theology rejects clinging to
biological existence at all costs because not only the living, but also the
dying, are objects of freedom of faith.s Acceptance of dying is an integral
59
feature of this belief.

On the other hand, measures that precipitate death or shorten the
process of dying are generally rejected due to societal notions against
suicide and homicide. However, rmasures to relieve pain and suffering are
considered to be morally justified even though death may be hastened as
a result. This is the principle of the double effect. The intent in "double
effect" is not to cause death by deliberate overdose of ndication, but to
use sufficient analgesic to alleviate the suffering of the patient. The
rejection of treatment that prolongs dying is strongly encouraged. In fact,
Catholic moral theology mandates a duty to reject burdensome rmdical
treatment and proclaims individuals must take responsibility for the manner
of their dying.6 The contemporary hospice moverent, which provides for
support and alleviation of pain in the dying process, is an important part of
this concept. Here, a Christian's dying is looked upon as the final gift of
God's calling to be conformed to Christ.

'See generally James F. Bresnahan, CatholicSpiritualityand MedicalInterentions in
Dying, 164 AMEIUCA 670-75 (1991).
-Md.
M d.
D1Id.
,qId.

59

Bresnahan,supranote 54, at 670-75.

0

Id.
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The exercise of freedom in dying as proposed by Karl Rahner, a
German Jesuit theologian, and Teilhard de Chardin, a French Jesuit
philosopher, emphasize autonomy for those near death.61 Dying patients
must permit themselves to be loved and cared for by dear ones and care
givers.62 On the other hand, the first concern of dying is usually for those
who will be left behind.63
The Christian approach, according to these Jesuit theologians, is that
prayerful reflection on Christ's dying should, shape decision making about
one's own death. In turn, this should influence decisions regarding
advanced directives in the form of a living will or durable power of
attorney for health care. Second, one's spirituality, or one's day-to-day
practice of his Christian faith should shape the individual and the common
response to others in their suffering and dying. Prayerful acceptance of
dying will allow one to deal appropriately with the dying of others and
prevent prolonging the dying process or resorting to preirature induced
death. The tendency of modem high technology medicine is to maintain
life-sustaining treatments rather than shift to care which primarily aims to
relieve suffering and enable the terminal patient to interact freely with
loved ones and friends. Thus, guidelines are essential to limit medical
interventions that merely prolong dying.
Other religions, in particular Middle and Far Eastern beliefs, also
include a concept of survival in the afterlife by the spirit or soul of the
individual. In Islam, Allah is God, and Mohammed is the prophet that
shows the way to Allah. This faith is significantly based on the
continuation of the spirit or soul into an afterlife. The single deity in
Buddhism and multiple deities in Hinduism also are representative of
afterlife goals. Although the Jewish faith does not emphasize an afterlife,
there is concern with a singular deity and following the prescribed life rules
in the Talmud.
The concepts of an afterlife have also been described in the works of
the ancient Egyptians, Greeks and Romans especially in the writings of
Homer, and Virgil. The concepts of an afterlife with reward and
6 1

Tn'~m

632Id.

1d.

DE C&ARDiN, ON Love D

HAPPINES (1984).
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punishment for behavior in this life can be found in these and other works.
An example is the crossing of the river Styx, with the boat man, Charon,
ferrying the souls over to the netherworld.
Religious Views on End of
Life Issues
Judaism forbids the hastening of death but allows removing impediments
to death.' Reformed and some orthodox rabbis permit the disconnection
of intravenous apparatus as an impediment. Jewish families usually request
that life sustaining measures be continued for a varying period of time after
which a final decision may be made.
Islam believes that illness is a result of God's or Allah's trial of the
people. Physical illness may be cured by recitation of the Koran or prayers.
Under Islamic belief, Allah is the creator of life, and no individual "owns"
his or her life. Therefore, no person can actively terminate such life.
Lutherans accept medical judgment on the best course of action.
They focus on the reality of the situation while affirming the resurrection
of the body in immortality after death. Pentecostal religions invoke the
New Testament gifts of healing. Believers turn to healing through prayer
and maintain a belief in miracles. Therefore, Pentecostal believers
generally will not terminate the PVS.
Afro-Caribbean religions, including som religious groups involving
Haitians, Cubans, Jamaicans, Puerto Ricans and African Americans,
consider healing as the work of religion. All healing takes place through
ritual adjustments between the person who is ill and his or her relationships
with the living, the dead, and the divine. In these religions, physicians play
a lesser role in healing and decision-making.
Indigenous groups in Mexico believe in traditional curing practices
performed by a healer, or "Curandero." The primitive common concept
of illness is fright, which jars the soul loose from the body. This loss of the
soul is considered the real cause of the illness, and therefore, the
Curandero begs the soul to return. However, after folk attempts to restore

AXK Cr&n, Remarim at Chicago Nemlogical Society Spring S~nposium on PVS (May
19, 1993) (text available from the Chicago Medical Society).
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health fail, Christian missionaries may be sought to supplement such
methods.
The traditional Irish view reveals that life is full of suffering and it
must be accepted with stoic resignation. If the person is to recover, then
he shall independent of any efforts that are made.
From a religious view, many systems consider death a transition to
another life and, thus, death does not necessarily mean the termination of
existence. Therefore, decisions regarding sustaining life in the face of
hopelessness or futility may not be quite so final or awesome, particularly
if appropriate counseling is obtained by a religious figure, whether it is a
priest, rabbi, or a minister of the respective faith of the dying person.
When dealing with religious and ethnic issues, it is important to
resolve conflicting beliefs through knowledge and sensitivity. Also,
breaching the language barrier with interpreters and involving ministers or
clerics of the respective religions will assist in dealing with ethnically
diverse patients and their families. It is best, of course, that individuals be
attended to by these ministers seen on a regular basis prior ito the illness.
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
Health care economics involves balancing costs and benefits of alternative
therapies. In recent years, economics of high technology medicine has
become an important issue, particularly for neurology and neurosurgery
specialists. Health care rationing appears inevitable; in fact, clandestine
rationing of health care has existed for a quite some time., e.g., "slow
codes" and benign neglect. Even Hippocrates listed a number of disorders,
such as severe head injuries that were not to be treated.
There are many principles of ethics involved in this decision making
process, including equity in the distribution of health care resources,
beneficence, non-maleficence and patient autonomy.
Cost benefit analysis and cost effectiveness are means by which the
best use of resources is achieved. Cost effectiveness deals with efficiency
of health care delivery systems and is monitored by utilization review
departments. Performance indicators are systematically and continuously
reviewed by health care facilities and third party payors such as private
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insurance companies, Medicare, and Medicaid. Cost benefit analysis is
more difficult and involves ethical as well as medical value judgments.
The cost of maintaining life must be balanced against the human
values of palliation, or the alleviation of suffering. If the only goal of
medical teatmrnt was to return a patient to an economically contributing
role in society, all terminal conditions would go untreated whether the
survival time is days, weeks, or months.
Quality of life is an important feature here, however, it is not a clearly
defined subject. What does quality of life mean? A good quality of life for
one who has significant disabilities may be considered a poor quality of life
by another whose body image cannot tolerate lesser deficits. This disparity
is exemplified by the cases of Edward Hyde and Stephen Hawking, both
of whom developed amyotrophic lateral sclerosis or Lou Gehrig's disease.
This condition causes a progressive loss in motor strength with eventual
total dependence on others. In the early stages of the disease, and while
only mildly affected, Mr. Hyde was unable to tolerate the inevitable and
inexorable course of the illness. Therefore, he became one of the early
assisted suicides of Dr. Kevorkian.
Professor Hawking on the other hand, although severely disabled,
continues to carry on his brilliant work in theoretical physics at the
University of Cambridge, U.K., where he occupies the Newton Chair. Dr.
Hawking has shown no inclination toward suicide, assisted or otherwise.
One method of assessing cost benefit is to measure outcomes with
and without treatment. However, this is still largely anecdotal, and
accurate outcome data for most conditions is often not applicable in
individual cases. The reason is there are multiple patient factors; and the
treatments themselves are not static, but rather evolving.
In order to estimate costs of various technologies and treatments it is
necessary to maintain detailed and extensive records. With the use of
computer systems, it soon will be possible to estimate, with considerable
accuracy, the costs of alternative therapies initially, as well as days, weeks,
and even months after treatment.
It is more difficult to assess benefits in terms of alleviation of anxiety
and reduction of symptoms. Treatment without cure may nonetheless
result in reduced dependency and resumption of former life activities. An
example of this is the radiation of certain spinal cord tumors, which may
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produce a temporary remission of symptoms, but provide no pennanent
cure. Even this outcome must be evaluated, with and without high
technology therapy, in order to arrive at a true cost benefit assessment.
Another thing to consider is that frequently, severe untreated
conditions will not terminate quickly. It is very difficult to determine
duration of life in terminal conditions with any degree of ce:rtainty, except
when vital functions begin to fail. Even then, predictions are surprisingly
inaccurate and thus, the cost of dying with no treatment may also be
significant.
One study indicated cost cutting measures utilized at the end of life
have been less effective than originally expected. Using figures from 1988,
even if all cost cutting measures, such as no high tech, no futile
intervention, and only care according to advanced directives, were used for
every American who is terminally ill, the savings in the 2.17 million deaths
that year would have been 3.3 percent of the nation's total health spending
of $500 billion. However, that figure would be lessened for the following
reasons:
(1) many elderly people are afraid to sign right-to-die documents that
delegate legal power over their health care;
(2) surrogates and families are often less willing to terminate health care
than the patients themselves;
(3) many people who are not going to accumulate large bills because their
medical care does not depend on cardiopulmonary resuscitation or
expensive technology or respiratory support machinery;
(4) even though complex medical intervention is not used, other
necessary kinds of care such as effective pain relief, nursing, and help
in daily living are quite expensive; and
(5) hospital stays may be reduced, but the use of nursing homes, home
health care, and hospices will increase.
In many cases, it is often unclear whether aggressive treatment will be
futile, or truly life saving, until it is attempted. Since there is no reliable
means to identify patients who will die, it is impossible to accurately say
which patients will benefit from intensive interventions and which ones will
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not. Such indeterminacy is present even when an assessment is made a few
days before death.
For advanced directives, the average hospital bill for those without an
advanced directive was $56,300 as compared to $61,589 for those with a
living will, and $58,346 for those with a durable power of attorney. For
do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders, the cost of care for those with DNR
orders was $62,594 for 616 patients, compared with $57,334 for 219
patients without DNR orders.
Clearly, resource conservation is important; and triage for the use of
life sustaining interventions is reasonable and necessary. However, it
appears the proffered substantial cost savings by limiting life sustaining
interventions and limiting aggressive care at the end of life is illusory.
Several scientific and economic studies have examined and analyzed
the persistent vegetative state. In one study, children were studied over a
five year period.6' Most of the patients were stable after the first year of
home care; and care takers felt most children had minimal awareness, that
is, voice recognition.' However, every child remained totally dependent,
and the cost of the care per patient averaged $90,000 per year. 7 In the
long term, the prognosis for children discharged from the hospital in a PVS
was very poor, in fact, 40 percent died during these five years.'
In another study, twenty-three patients in PVS were reviewed, all
requiring at least one type of mechanical assistance such as respirators,
nasogastric or gastrostomy tubes, or intravenous lines."9 Each case was
complicated by incontinence and, in a majority or cases, by decubitus
ulcers, pneumonia, and urinary tract infections." The bills for thirteen
patients averaged $170,000, and the length of stay for all patients averaged
almost two-hundred days with the total number of "bed days" averaging
twelve and a half bed years. 7
1'A-L Fields et al., Outcomes of Children in a PersistentVegetative State, 21 CRUr. C.NR

MIn. 1890-94 (1993).
61d.
67Id.

"Id.
0DAM. Kaufiran& PB. Upton, The PersistentVegetative State-An Analysis of Clinical

Correlates
and Costs, 92 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 381-84 (1992).
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Survival of patients in PVS may extend for many years depending
heavily upon the level of supportive care. A Hastings Center report in
1988 estimated the annual cost for PVS patients as high as $1 billion. 72
Thus, from a cost effective standpoint, poor outcomes do not seem to
justify requirements for mechanical support. The consideration of resource
utilization and resource availability is significant, because other individuals
whose outcome is more optimistic may be denied beneficial therapies due
to resource limitations.
Although insurance companies have sought to limit reimbursement for
unproven, and seemingly futile measures, those with sufficient funds have
been successful in extracting payments through legal action.73 This
capricious policy seems unfair because the process favors the rich over the
poor and the assertive and articulate over the reticent and less expressive.
LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
Role of Ethics Committees
An Institutional Ethics Committee (IEC) is a multi-disziplinary body
commissioned by a health care institution for the consideration and
application of societal and ethical values to aspects of patient care, or other
select institutional issues associated with the delivery or non-delivery of
health care services.
Ethics committees on ethical consultations have been present in an
unofficial or quasi-official capacity for many years, particularly in churchrun institutions associated with religious bodies. One of the earliest
stimulus for the initiation of an institutional ethics conmittee was the
development of the kidney dialysis machine in the early 1960's, used for
treatment of end-stage renal disease. 74 This procedure necessitated
selection and rejection of patients, since resources were extremely limited.
In recent years, there has been rapid growth of medilcal technologies
"2R.E. Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality, 18 HASTINGS
CENTEREP. 31 (1988) (Special Supplement).

"See Gina Kolata, Patients'Lawyers Lead Insurersto Payfor Unproven Treatments, N.Y.
TMES, Mar. 28, 1994, at Al.
7'G. J. Annas, Ethics Committees: FromEthical Comfort to EthicalCover, 21 HASTINGS
CENM REP. 18 (May/June 1991).
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resulting in a medical ability to sustain physiological or vegetative existence
almost indefinitely. However, there remain finite health care resources,
and patient care selection must be made. Additionally, there is a lack of
clarity and uniformity in the law regarding termination of life-sustaining
therapies. The advanced directive legislation of recent years has been
fostered by the work of ethics committees. Finally, there has been a
perception of a need for health care institutions to have a single, multidisciplinary body or forum to address complex mixes of medical, ethical,
and legal issues.
Presently, neither federal, nor Illinois law, requires the formation of
institutional ethics committees or IECs. Also, the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO) has no formal ethics
committee requirement in their guidelines. However, some legal factors
leading to the voluntary formation of EEC's have included:
(1) The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and BioMedical and Behavioral Research Commission;"
(2)
"Baby Doe r'federal regulations; 76
(3) "Baby
Doe II" federal regulations;
(4) State enactment of advanced directive statutes such as the Illinois
Living Will Act, 78 and the Powers of Attorney for Health Care Act;. 9
and
(5) State enactment of health care surrogate acts such as the Illinois
Health Care Surrogate Act."

75

PRESIDENT'S COMIASSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLE.IS V MEDIIE &
BKMBDIOCrAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH COMMISSION, DEcIogiqo TO FORGO Laem SUSTAINIG
TREATms2r. ETHCAl, MEDICAL AND .UGAL
ISSUES I TREATMENT DECISIONS (Mar. 21,1983).
76

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994); 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1996).

7745 C.F.R. § 1340 (1996) (Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 and 1986 effective Oct. 9,

1985).
78755 ]LCS 35/1-10 (West 1996) (effective Jan. 1, 1984).
7p755 ILCS 45/4-1-4-12 (West 1996) (effective Sept. 22,1987). All fifty States now have
some form of advanced directive statutes.
817 55 ]LCS 40/1-55 (West 1996) (effective Sept. 26, 1991).
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Other factors include:
(1) The Federal Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990;8
(2) Patient Rights Standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO);' and
(3) Report No. 34 of the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs on
decisions to forego life sustaining treatment for incompetent
83
patients.
The Ethics Committee is a forum for identification, exploration, and
consultation on bio-medical, ethical, and related legal issues affecting
hospitals, patients, and staff. Committee functions include: assisting
administration and health care staff in the development and review of
policies and guidelines on ethical concerns, responsibilities and
performance; providing consultation to the hospital staff, patients and
family members on ethical, moral, and philosophical issues related to
patient care; and, coordinating and providing education on ethical issues
in health care.
There is no mandatory decisional power, but the conclusions and
recommendations of the committee have considerable influence on clinical
services.
Procedures for Ethics
Committees
The IEC generally meets on a regular basis to consider policy
recommendations and to provide consultations for ethical dilemmas that
occur during the course of patient care. A structured procedure for
consultation is followed; and, after review of the patient's background,
including cultural and religious factors, the matter at issue is presented to
the Ethics Committee. In making recommendations, the. Committee
follows the state as well as the Federal Law.
8142 U.S.C. § 1396a(w) (1994).
8JOINT

COMMISSION

ON ACCRrDITATION

ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS,

OF

HEALTH

CARE ORGANIZATIONS,

105-6 (1993).

'Reports of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the AMA, Vol. 11, No. 2, July
1991.
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Elective cases are reviewed at the regularly scheduled ethics meeting.
In emergencies, a quorum of committee members, either in person or by
conference call, renders a decision. Retrospective reviews of cases may be
carried out to provide more information on patient care as well as to gather
data for policy formation.
Records
Many issues that come under the purview of the ethics committee have
legal implications; and, therefore, it is necessary to maintain accurate and
detailed documentation of discussions and recommendations. This
ordinarily takes the form of the "minutes" of the committee meeting itself.
Immunity
There is statutory immunity for EEC members under state law. For
example, in Illinois, relevant statutes include the Living Will Acto the
Power of Attorney for Health Care Act,"s and the Health Care Surrogate
6
Act.
Education
The educational function is carried out by committee member participation
in various bioethical conferences and dialogues at the local, state, and
national level. In addition, education of the hospital medical staff is
performed at set intervals to review the requirements and any changes in
advance directive statutes or surrogate decision making laws.
Ethics committees must acknowledge both patients' rights and
providers' moral duties in their deliberations. With increasing patient and
family participation, paternalistic attitudes from caregivers are no longer
appropriate and may denote bias. In other words, overbearing attitudes
may be construed as indicative of a personal interest in a particular
outcome.

"4755 RLCS 35[7 (West 1996).
'5755 ILCS 45/4-8 (West 1996).
E5755 H-CS 40/35 (West 1996).

520

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

Vol. 1:495

Right to Die Tssues and Cases
When suffering from PVS, the patient loses any semblance of functional
and quality living. The purpose of allowing a patient to die is to preserve
that patient's dignity. Roe v. Wade' and other abortion rights decisions
have produced an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution that assures a right to personal autonomy over
one's body and existence. Earlier court decisions such as Karen Ann
Quinlan' in 1976 and Nancy Cruzan89 in 1990 established the right of the
hopelessly ill to refuse life preserving medical treatment and to allow a
dignified, natural death.
The Karen Ann Quinlan caser was the first to focus national attention
on the problems created by the use of medical maintenance systems. These
problems entailed the prolongation of patient suffering, the potential for
family financial ruin, and the misutilization of scarce medical resources.
Karen Quinlan overdosed with Phenobarbital and Librium,9' After it
became apparent she would not regain consciousness, Quinlan's father
requested artificial life support be withdrawn. 2 Quinlan's physicians
refused, fearing a potential charge of homicide. 93 Quinlan's father was
unable to order a withdrawal of treatment himself, because Quinlan was
twenty-one years old. Therefore, because Quinlan had reached the age of
majority, her father was no longer her natural guardian. Quinlan's father
was then appointed her legal guardian treating subsequently ordering the
withdrawal of treatment. 94 However, the treating physicians refused to
comply with this request; and, as a result, the matter was taken to court.95
The New Jersey Supreme Court held Quinlan's father, acting as Quinlan's
legal guardian, could order the withdrawal of treatment. 96 Further, such

'Roe v. Wade, 401 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).

'In re Quinlan, 355 A2d 647 (N.L 1976).
"Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
'In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.L 1976).
91
1n re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801,806 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) modified and remanded
355 A.2d 647 (N.L 1976).
92In re Quinlan,355 A.2d at 651.
937d. at 651-52, 669-70.

94355 A2d 647, 653 (N.L 1976).
95Id.
96Id. at 671-72.
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withdrawal of treatment would not be considered homicide, but rather the
recognition of the exercise of a legitimate right to refuse treatment in
Quinlan's best interestY Quinlan was then weaned from the ventilator,
surprisingly, continued to breathe spontaneously for an additional nine
years while maintained on artificial feedings. She eventually succumbed to
overwhelming infection and died.
Eleven years after Quinlan's death, a similar situation arose in the case
In re Jobes.9s Mary Ellen Jobes was pregnant when she was involved in
a car accident and subsequently required surgical intervention for removal
of her fetus. During the surgery, Jobes suffered an ischemic episode (lack
of oxygen or blood flow in the brain or both) and failed to awaken."CJ For
several years, Jobes' life was maintained by tube feeding."' However,
when Jobes' husband wanted to discontinue all treatment, her physician
and nursing home refused."°2 On August 10, 1987, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey ruled in favor of the family on the basis of substituted
judgment involving the surrogate making a treatment decision based on the
patient's preference. 3 Treatment was then terminated.
Paul Brophy was also in PVS after undergoing an unsuccessful
operation for a ruptured basilar tip aneurysmt' 4 His life was maintained
by artificial feeding for three years"0 5 despite numerous witnesses who
attested to Brophys premorbid wish and intention not to live a vegetative
existence.' 6 The treating physician and trial court, nonetheless, refused the
request of Brophy's wife to discontinue tubal feeding. 7 A Massachusetts
court determined the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, and the
ethical precepts of the medical profession were state interests sufficient to

97

1d. at 669-70.

'In re Jobes, 510 A.2d 133 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 19S6).
'Id. at 134.
100ld.
101
1d.
1
02d. at 135.
0
' 3In re Jobes, 510 A.2d 133, 135-36 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 19S6).
"°Brophyv. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 628 (Mass. 1986).
1
05Id.

"°cId. at 632 n.22.
"Id. at 632.
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require continued tubal feeding."° However, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts allowed discontinuance of further treatment, 1' 9 and Brophy
died eight days later.
Nancy Cruzan entered a PVS after sustaining severe injuries in an
automobile accident."' Without court approval, hospital employees refused
to honor the request of Cruzan's parents to terminate artificial nutrition
and hydration."' A Missouri court authorized the termination, finding

evidence of Cruzan's desire not to live in a PVS from the testimony of
Cruzan's former housemate.l Cruzan had allegedly stated she would not
wish to continue her life if sick or injured unless she had the potential to

return to a halfway normally existence.113
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed." 4 While recogmizing a right
to refuse treatment embodied in the common law doctrine of informed
consent, the court questioned its applicability in this case." 5 The court also
declined to read a broad right to privacy that would support an unrestricted
right to refuse treatment within the state constitution." 6 The court then
decided the Missouri living will statute evidenced a state policy strongly
favoring the preservation of life." 7 Cruzan's statements to her housemate
were seen as unreliable and insufficient for determining Cruzan's intent." 8
The court rejected an argument claining Cruzan's parents were entitled to
order the termination of her medical treatment concluding no person may
assume such a choice for an incompetent individual in the absence of the
living will statute requirements or other "clear and convincing evidence"
of the patient's wishes." 9

'mid. at 634.

'O'Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 63940 (Mass. 1986).
"°Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,266 (1990).
1

11d. at 267-68.
at 268.
11d.

'"Id.
3
114

Id.
"SCruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,268-69 (1990).
116
7

1d. at 268.

1 Id.
1 8Id.
119

1d. at 268-69.
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The United States Supreme Court held in Cruzan that when
addressing the withdrawal of life saving treatment, the Constitution did not
forbid Missouri to require clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent
person's wishes.' 20 Most state courts have based a right to refuse
treatment on the common-law right to infornmed consent and a
constitutional right to privacy.' 2' A competent person arguably has a
liberty interest in refusing unwanted treatment under the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution, however, this right must be balanced against
relevant state interests.' While the Court only assuned the premise that
a competent person has a constitutionally protected right to refuse life
saving hydration and nutrition," it held that an incompetent person does
not necessarily possess the same right; because that person is unable to
make an informed and voluntary choice. 24
Missouri has established a procedural safeguard to assure the action
of surrogate decision makers conforms to the wishes expressed by the
patient while competent."z As a result, the State can effectively guard
against potential abuses by surrogates who may not act in the patient's best
interest.m The State may also properly decline to make judgments about
the "quality" of an individual life and need only assert a general, unqualified
interest in the preservation of human life to weigh against the
constitutionally protected interests of the individual 12 7
The Court felt it was self-evident that these interests are more
substantial, on an individual and societal level, than those involved in
common civil disputes.' The clear and convincing evidence standard also
served as a societal commentary about how the risk of error should be
distributed between the litigants. 29 Missouri permissibly places the
increased risk of an erroneous decision on those seeking to terminate life'Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,280 (1990).

121

d. at 271.

12M. at 278-79.
1

2id. at 279.
mid. at 280.
L2Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,280 (1990).
1
'Id. at 281.
wlId. at 282.
at 283.
mId.
1
2Id.
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sustaining treatment. 130 An erroneous decision not to terdnate results in
a maintaining of the status quo, allowing room for a potentially wrong
decision to be corrected, or its impact mitigated by an advancement in
medical science or the patient's unexpected death.'
However, an
erroneous decision to withdraw such treatment is not capable of
correction.132
The Missouri Supreme Court did not commit constitutional error in
concluding the evidence introduced at trial did not amount to clear and
1 33
convincing proof of Cruzan's desire to withdraw hydration and nutrition.
The trial court had not adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard
and Cruzan's statement claiming she did not want to live life as a
"vegetable" did not specifically deal with the withdrawal of medical
treatment or hydration and nutrition."
Nancy Cruzan's parents were undoubtedly qualified to exercise a right
of "substituted judgment" if such judgment was mandated by the
Constitution. 135 However, for the same reasons it may require clear and
convincing evidence of a patient's wishes, Missouri may also choose to
defer solely to those wishes rather than confide in the decsions of close
13 6
family members.
Although the five-four majority supported the individual's
constitutional right to refuse redical treatment, the opinion was based on
the liberty and Due Process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the common law doctrine of informed consent. In its decision, the Court
did not make a distinction between the withdrawal of nutrition and
hydration versus the removal of cardio-respiratory support. This decision,
however, supported the validation of living wills and durable powers of
attorney for health care.

'Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,283 (1990).
1
13
Id.
32 d.
33
Md. at 285.
tIod.

13'Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286 (1990).
"Id. at 286-87.
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The Missouri courts did eventually find clear and convincing evidence
of Cruzan's desire to die, and artificial nutrition and hydration were
subsequently removed. Nancy Cruzan died ten days later.
These cases illustrate the varied approaches utilized by courts when
resolving PVS issues. There is emphasis on patient autonomy and thus, if
the patient, or her surrogate acting on her behalf, has made a competent,
infornmd decision to discontinue treatment in light of uncontrollable
suffering, futile treatment, or poor quality of life, the decision must be
honored.
Illinois Law
Two different forms of advanced directives are available to patients in
Illinois: the Power of Attorney for Health Care (PAHC) and the Living
Will. The PAHC enables patients to choose an agent, ideally a close
relative or friend familiar with the values of the patient, to make all health
care decisions in the event the patient becomes mentally incapacitated. 37
The PAHC has flexibility since it enables the agent chosen by the patient
to make decisions for a temporarily incapacitated patient and for an
incompetent patient who becomes terminally ill.u s A physician complying
in good faith with the wishes of the patient's agent will have legal immunity
for medical decisions including the decision to discontinue life sustaining
139
treatment.

In Ilinois, a living will is much more restrictive. It enables a
competent patient to instruct an attending physician to withdraw deathdelaying interventions if the patient becomes incompetent, terminally ill, or
0
is imminently threatened with death.14
Advanced directives are intended to enhance the autonomy of
patients, assuring their values are given primary consideration in medical
decisions after the patient becomes incorrpetent. 4' In order to achieve this
end, competent patients should be encouraged to discuss with their chosen
agent and physician, their values and preferences, such as what quality of
L"'See 755 MICS 45/4-1 -4-12. (West 1996).
L%'
75 5 HCS 45/4-1 (West 1996).
3755 ILCS 45/4-8 (West 1996).
"See 755 ILCS 35/1 - 10 (West 1996)
141755 ICS 35/1 (Vest 1996).
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life restrictions would be unacceptable. Indeed, decisions made by a
patient's agent should reflect the values of the patient.
The Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act (HCSA) helps to assure a
patient's wish to forego life sustaining treatment will be followed even if
the patient does not have an advanced directive. 142 The HCSA provides
physicians and surrogates of qualified patients with the power to withdraw
or withhold life-sustaining treatment, and thereby allow the patient to die
naturally without turning to the expensive and time consuming legal
process. 43 Qualifying patients are those who have one of the following:
a terminal condition; permanent unconsciousness; or an incurable and
irreversible condition that imposes severe pain or an otherwise inhumane
burden on the patient which may ultimately lead to death."4 By following
the guidelines set forth in HCSA, health care providers gain immunity from
criminal prosecution and civil suit regarding decisions to forego life
support -- with the exception of gross and flagrant negligence. 4 '
This mandate has been implemented at most hospitals by providing
standardized forms to be read and signed by the patient at the time of
admission. However, hospital admissions officers should be trained to
counsel and advise the patient and answer any questions about the material.
Representative Law in
Other States
Virtually all states have enacted natural death or death with dignity
statutes; however, most states do not specifically address PVS, In 1977,
California was the first state to enact its own Natural Death Act, aimed at
granting a competent adult the legal right to make a written directive to
withhold or withdraw life sustaining procedures in the event of terminal
illness.'46 Other states have enacted similar provisions providing their
citizens with the opportunity for death with dignity by means of a living

42

' See 755 ILCS 40/5 - 55 (West 1996).

1

431d.

'44755 ILCS 40/10 (West 1996).
4-75 5 ILCS 40/35 (West 1996).
4Note, The CaliforniaNaturalDeathAct: An EmpiricalStudy of Physicians'Practice,
31 STAN. L. Rnv. 913 (1979).
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will Enacted in 1982, Delaware's Death with Dignity Act was the first
act to provide a durable power-of-attorney for health care statute.
Another approach to PVS is a rationing program which has been
implemented in several other states including Oregon. Under the Oregon
Health Plan, there is a standard benefit package for Medicaid patients that
will not pay for the treatment of certain conditions such as severe brain
injury and aggressive medical treatment for end-stage cancers."48 PVS is
not specifically mentioned in the broad outline, but it is listed in the
category of "severe brain injury" where treatment is considered ineffective
or futile. However, comfort care such as pain management and hospice
care is provided for these conditions.
Federal Law
In December 1991, the Patient Self Determination Act (PSDA) took effect,
thereby requiring all patients admitted to a hospital or nursing home
receive written information notifying them of their right to make decisions
concerning medical care. Such rights include the right to accept or refuse
medical treatment and to formulate advanced directives consistent with the
laws of their state. At the time of admission, all patients must be asked
whether they have already executed an advanced directive. However, the
provision of care may not be conditioned or influenced by whether an
advanced directive is in place.149
Under the PSDA, hospitals must develop policies assuring that a
patient's advanced directive is implemented to the greatest extent
permissible under state law.1 "0 Health care providers who object to an
advanced directive on the basis of conscience may transfer the patient to
another provider who agrees to abide by the terms of the advanced
directive.
Patients are not required to fill out advanced directives while
hospitalized, nor are they required at the time of admission to decide
whether they wish to receive various life-sustaining interventions if
4

4'DEL. CODEANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983).
'45MJ. Garland, Justice, Politics and Community: Eypanding Access and Rationing
Health Services in Oregon, 20 Lw, MED. &HEALTH CARE 67-81 (1992).
14942 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(w)(1)(C) (1994).
'42 U.S.C. § 1396a(w) (1994).
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necessary. Yet, with a formal policy, eliciting patients' wishes regarding
death and dying will become a routine part of the admission process. The
formalization of the process helps remove the pessimistic implication of
imminent death from later discussions.
Representative Law in
Other Countries
In the health care systems of Canada, Germany, Sweden, New Zealand,
and Australia, the problems associated with maintaining PVS patients are
not specifically addressed.' This might be explained by considering that
the high technology commonly utilized in the United States is not as readily
available in other countries.
In the Netherlands, assisted suicide is an option in hopeless or
terminal conditions, however, the process must be voluntary and formal
confirmation by a colleague must be obtained. The United Kingdom and
2
Norway also condone assisted suicide in the same manner.1
CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
The condition of PVS remains somewhat fluid, and the accuracy of this
important diagnosis is currently limited. While futility of treatment may be
determined, futility of life is dependent on other factors including religious
and cultural issues. Ethics committees play an important rol- in weighing
the issues of medicine, economics, and law in these cases.
Economics and resources are important considerations in the care and
treatment of PVS patients. However, the anticipated cost savings
associated with the limitation of high technology treatments or support
may not materialize in these cases, because other costly measures must be
incorporated to provide supportive and palliative care.
Advance directive statutes exist in varying forms in all fifty states.
Nevertheless, most PVS patients do not execute advanced directives.

UColleen M. Grogan,Deciding on Access andLevels of Care:A Comparisonof Canada,

Britian,Germany, and the UnitedStates, 17 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L 213-:32 (1992).
'J. Van Eys, Remarks: Dying Well: A Major Conference (May 25, 1994) (text available
in The Ethics Center at Garrett-Evangelical Seminary/Northwestern University, Evanston, IL).
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When pressed with the withdrawal and removal of nutrition and
hydration, physicians must be sensitive to the symbolic value of feeding and
providing nutrition, as well as the appearance of abandonment when
treatment is removed. Other supportive care must be continued regardless
of the prognosis. Patients and surrogates must be infornmd in advance that
withhokling medical nutrition and hydration may be more comfortable than
providing some food and water.
Many critics are rightfully concerned that abuses may occur and,
therefore, safeguards must be incorporated into any adopted policies or
enacted legislation. Care must be taken so the permissibility of withholding
ndical nutrition and hydration viii not be transformed into a policy to
forego treatment with vulnerable populations such as the elderly and
mentally impaired. Likewise, cost containment pressures must not lead
physicians to become social gate keepers at the bedside. This questionable
role would inevitably be viewed as bias by some and may even lead to legal
vulnerability. Quite simply, decisions must be shared by all parties
concerned.
Finally, in applying any algorithm, health care providers, especially
physicians, must thoroughly communicate with patients and surrogate
decision makers in order to avoid potentially drastic misunderstandings.
APPENDLX

The criteria of brain death, as established by the ad hoc committee of the
Harvard Medical School 5 3 are the following:
(1) Unreceptivity and unresponsivity - total unawareness to externally
applied stimuli and complete unresponsiveness.
(2) No movements or breathing - No spontaneous muscular movement
or spontaneous respiration or response to stimuli such as pain, touch,
sound or light. Observation should cover a period of at least one
hour by a physician.

'HY Beecher, Chair, A DefinitionofIrreversibleComa: Report of the ad hoc Commitc
of the HarvardMedicalSchool to Examine the Definition of BrainDeath, 205 JAMA 337-340

(1968).
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(3) No reflexes - A) Fixed dilated pupils, non-reactive to direct source of
light; B) No ocular movement; C) Absent corneal and pharyngeal
reflexes; D) Absent deep tendon reflexes.
(4) Flat EEG- *The EEG should be run at maximum gain. **There
should be no response to noise or pain. **The EEG should be
repeated at least once within twenty-four hours later with no change.
(1) In addition, condition of hypothermia must be excluded, that is,
temperature below 90 degrees Fahrenheit or 32.2 degrees
Centigrade and,
(2) Central nervous system depressant such as barbiturates should
not be present. The EEG is a confirmatory finding for cerebral
death but is not a sufficient criteria itself. In Illinois and Indiana
there are slight variations to the previously listed protocol. The
following clinical criteria for brain death are necessary and
sufficient to diagnose brain death: the patient must be in deep
coma - unresponsive to verbal or painful stimuli; no brain stem
reflexes (spinal reflexes may be present); no spontaneous
respirations; no spontaneous movements or posturing; the cause
of coma must be established and sufficient to account for the loss
of brain function; criteria for brain death are not valid where the
level of central nervous system depressants is greater than
therapeutic levels. When clinically indicated a drug screen must
be performed to exclude this possibility; criteria for brain death
are not valid if the patient's temperature is below 32.2 degrees
Centigrade (90 degrees F); the criteria must be met at the time of
a repeat evaluation two hours apart. If gross irreparable brain
trauma is present, this interval may be reduced; there is a
difference in the evaluation of children in that in children under
two months it is recommended that two examinations and EEG's
be performed at least forty-eight hours apart. In patients two
months to one year, two examinations and EEG's separated by
at least twenty-four hours should be done. A repeat examination
and EEG are not necessary if a concomitant cerebral radio
nuclide angiographic study demonstrates no visualization of
cerebral arteries.

1997]

PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE

531

Another test commonly used is called the apnea test. Because the
respiratory drive is the most caudal of the brain stem responses, an apnea
study should be considered if performed in a specific manner. If
spontaneous respiration is not stimulated after the arterial PCO2 is
60mn/Hg or greater, then the presence of brain stem death is confinmed.
This definition is also consistent with global or whole brain death or brain
stem death.
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PROPOSED ALGORITHM
Guidelines for Termination of Treatment for PVS Patients
Phase 1: Assessment
A. Functional assessment performed, after following criteria are:
1. brain death criteria have NOT been mete;

2. vital signs are normal (exception, if on ventilator respiration rate
need not be normal)b,
3. key blood work value has normalized times';
4. toxic screen negatived;
5. anticonvulsant levels have non-toxic times.'
Assessment should include specific mention of level of interaction
with surroundings:
.1.
2.
3.
4.

response to verbal, written or gestural communication;
presence, extent and type of eye contact;
autonomic response to interpersonal interaction;
specific mention of the presence or absence and type of voluntary
movements.

Specific documentation of quantitative neurophysiologcal function,
including some or all of the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

EEG times f;
evoked potentials;
SPECT/PET brain scans;
pharmacological challenge with central nervous system stimulant;
second opinion.

If unable to adequately assess status, re-attempt in one month.
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If the assessment corroborated severe impairment such that the prior
human qualities of the patient are no longer evident and there are no
known effective therapies to redress this condition, then the following
procedure will be initiated.
Phase 2: Procedure
A. Formal notification by attending physician in writing of a management
meeting concerning the patient will be made to family, friends and/or
significant others including close friends if appropriate, attending
physician (or his/her physician representative), hospital counsel (or
his/her representative), and appropriate clergy.
B.

Formal meeting with family, friends, and/or significant others with
attending physician, hospital counsel, and appropriate clergy.
Specific topics discussed include:
1. Telling the family of the severity of condition and the prognosis;
2. Review of advance directives to include: living will, power of
attorney for health care, written or oral statements by patient,
etc.;
3. Social/psychological impact of continued care;
4. Utilization of resources such as critical care beds and
technologies which are costly and limited in availability,
5. Impact of decisions on possible future litigation on the patient's
or hospital's behalf,
6. Discussion of options:
a. Continued prolongation of life with no restriction;
b. DNR only, with continuance of all standard medical care;
c. DNR plus other options listed below:
i passive neglect - no further or new diagnostic testing or
treatments;
ii active withdrawal - withdrawal of hydration and nutrition%
7. Recomnendation for termination of care;
8. Right to transfer to other hospital, long term care facility or
hospice;
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9. Names of appropriate consultants for an independent second
opinion if desired;
10. Reasonable time frame for patients and family or surrogate to
consider the options.
C. Plan
1. If a consensus plan is established, it will be become part of the
medical record and be signed by the attending physician (or his
designate), and hospital counsel to insure that proper procedure
is followed;
2. If a consensus plan cannot be reached, HospitalMedical Center
Ethics Committee will meet expeditiously and render a written
opinion and recommendation with regard to the appropriate level
of therapy for the patient. This may be used as evidence in a legal
hearing. The hearsay objection may be overcome if the person
who drafted the report is available to testify. The Ethics
Committee may choose to utilize the Neuroscience Subcommittee
of the Hospital Ethics Committee for this purpose;
3. If a consensus plan still cannot be established then alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) will be instituted involving all parties
with a reasonable medical legal and personal interest in the
patient, i.e., hospital, ethics committee, hospital counsel,
attending physician, family members, family attorney, clergy.
This will include negotiation, mediation, arbitration, etc.
Alternative dispute resolution consists of extrajudcial methods
of resolving controversies without court involvement. It is not a
new system and has actually been in existence since ,ancient times
when early tribal chiefs or "wise old men" perormed such
functions as rmdiation and arbitration. In recent yexs, ADR has
been incorporated into the court system where at certain stages
in the court proceedings, the parties may either voluntarily or by
compulsion enter into mediation, arbitration, conferences, minitrials, or similar procedures.
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The principal ADR processes are:
1. mediation/negotiation;
2. arbitration; and
3. summary jury trial.
Mediation is an informal nonbinding and voluntary procedure.
The third party is neutral and selected by the two parties. There
is unrestricted presentation of evidence, arguments, and interests.
The outcome is a mutually acceptable agreement or no
agreement, and the process is private.
Arbitration is a more formal procedure, is binding, and it is
mandatory if contractual Similar to mediation, the third party or
parties are neutral and selected or appointed by the parties
concerned. There is presentation oeproof and arguments. The
outcome is a principled award. While arbitration is private, it is
subject to judicial enforcement.
The summary jury trial, mini-trial, and judicial settlement
conferences are considered pre-trial screening panels. The
purpose of a pretrial screening panel is to determine the merit of
a claim prior to a civil court action. This process encourages a
solution based on the objective opinion of the panel and may be
deemed admissible in court.
4. As a last resort, a court decision is requested. In the guidelines
on futile care at Santa Monica Hospital Center in California, 1" a
cost shifting mechanism is introduced at this point. When it is
determined that the patient can no longer benefit from the
hospital stay, but the patient or his family insists on him remaining
there, a mechanism for personal payment is initiated where the
family assumes the cost.
D. The attending physician will again review the signs, symptoms, and
history of the patient and confirm that there is certainty of diagnosis
'"Hosp. & HEALTH NmrwORKS, Feb. 20, 1994, at 28.
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and prognosis to implement this algorithm. (The standard is a high
degree of medical certainty or beyond a reasonable doubt). This will
serve as a final confirmation of the clinical status. It should be done
imnediately prior to implementing the options in 2(B)(6) above.

Notes:
a.

Termination of life support in the face of brain death has already been established.
The difficult issue involves patients with residual neurological finction, but with
severe impaired high cortical function.

b.

This implies that the patient's medical condition is not in flux, and therefore, it
is a reasonable time to make a binding functional assessment.

C.

See suprab.

d.

This is a safeguard against making a patient evaluation in the context of the
unintentional or intentional presence of poisonous, illicit, or otherwise harmful
substances acting upon the patient.

e.

Many brain injury patients are on anticonvulsant medications in order to suppress
harmful seizure activity. Very high or toxic levels can suppress3 higher cortical
functions thereby falsely impairing intrinsic residual function. Repeat tests to
insure accuracy.

f.

Clear and convincing standard of evidence. Because of its uncertainty in these
cases, one or two abnormal EEG exams would fall into the preponderance level
of evidence only.

g.

This is considered to be a swift and compassionate means to terminate life.

